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REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
IN GLOBAL LAW FIRMS: PEACE IN OUR TIME?
Janine Griffiths-Baker* & Nancy J. Moore**
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal rise of the global law firm, which began in the 1980s,
has transformed the face of international legal practice. 1 Closer economic
and political ties between countries, global advertising, and improved
transport and communication systems have allowed goods, capital, and
personnel to be transferred worldwide. As a result, there are now more
cross-border transactions between governments, individuals, and
businesses. To this end, the practice of law has also become “global,” as
lawyers play their part in the growing international market for corporate and
commercial services.
While globalization has no doubt brought positive developments for
some, it has created significant challenges for others. As clients
increasingly seek specialist advice at competitive prices, traditional
professional values are more and more at odds with lawyers’ commercial
interests and with the commercial interests of a highly privileged client
group. Some have questioned whether the emergence of a commercially
driven professional paradigm is the best way forward. 2 Others have
described globalization as a “slippery concept” that fundamentally
challenges the jurisdiction and authority of regulators.3
The global expansion of legal practice has prompted several jurisdictions
to consider how their own legal services markets should be regulated in an
ever-increasing global economy. 4 Yet, although significant attention has
* Deputy Principal and Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University College, London.
** Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University Law School.
1. See John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and
Economic Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 169 (1996);
John Flood, Megalaw in the UK: Professionalism or Corporatism? A Preliminary Report,
64 IND. L.J. 569 (1989); Marc Galanter, Mega-law and Mega-lawyering in the
Contemporary United States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS,
AND OTHERS 152 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983).
2. See Harry McVea, Predators and the Public Interest—The ‘Big Four’ and MultiDisciplinary Practices, 65 MOD. L. REV. 811 (2002).
3. Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us: The Need for Empirical
Research in Regulating Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 1009, 1014 (2010).
4. See, e.g., ABA REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, 29–
33 (Aug. 2002), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/final_mjp_rpt_6-5.pdf. More recently, in
2009, the ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission was created. Current efforts include proposals
concerning the admission of foreign lawyers, outsourcing of legal services, and choice of
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been paid to factors that drive cross-border legal work, only limited
scholarly consideration has been given to the practicalities of regulating the
day-to-day practice of law on an international scale. 5
A universal framework for governing international legal work has yet to
be established, and while some jurisdictions have adopted choice-of-law
principles to determine which rules apply across borders, 6 many others have
conflicting and incompatible rules. While it can be argued that uniformity
in cross-border transactions is desirable on a number of levels, in practice,
several important questions need to be addressed if this is to be achieved. If
a common set of rules is to be adopted, can a consensus be reached as to
which should be used? Would it be possible to reconcile the differences
among many jurisdictions to create a single framework? If not, which
country’s rules should be accepted? Would it be better to devise an entirely
new structure for regulating global legal practice?
Carole Silver has argued that before any such rules are considered, global
regulation should be based upon sound empirical evidence.7 She urges
empirical scholars to work with law schools and legal professions “to
generate a comprehensive understanding of the activities and actors
comprising the legal profession as it exists in the context of globalization.”8
By acting in a collaborative way, she hopes that more effective regulation
will result and that light will be shed on the activities of the legal profession
in a global context.9
This Article attempts to “shed light” on methods of regulating the
conduct of lawyers in the context of a reasonably well-defined area of
difficulty for the global law firm—namely, conflicts of interest. By
focusing on just one area of cross-border practice and by describing the
particular difficulties experienced by lawyers, regulators, and clients, we
hope to inform the debate on how best to regulate lawyers in a global
environment.
Conflicts of interest provide a useful study in this respect. Unlike some
areas of practice, it is a generally accepted principle that lawyers should not
act for two or more clients whose interests may potentially conflict.10 In
law regarding both alternative law practice structures and conflicts of interest. See id. In this
Article, we consider and comment on the proposal concerning choice of law regarding
conflicts of interest.
5. See, e.g., James R. Faulconbridge et al., Global Law Firms: Globalization and
Organizational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455 (2008);
Catherine A. Rogers, Lawyers Without Borders, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1035 (2009); Detlev F.
Vagts, Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677 (2000).
6. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION
cmt. 3.3 (May 28, 2011), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?
DocumentUid=1730FC33-6D70-4469-9B9D-8A12C319468C.
7. See Silver, supra note 3, at 1014.
8. See id. at 1015.
9. See id.
10. See generally CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: A GUIDE FOR BANKS, AUDITORS AND LAW
FIRMS (Keith Clark ed., 2011) (discussing conflicts rules in Europe); JANINE GRIFFITHSBAKER, SERVING TWO MASTERS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE MODERN LAW FIRM (2002)
(focusing on conflicts rules in the United Kingdom); SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED
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recent times, however, this proscription has come under increasing pressure
for four reasons: (1) a significantly increased demand for specialist legal
services, (2) the globalization of commerce, (3) a dramatic growth in the
size of law firms, and (4) much greater mobility within the profession.11
For the purposes of this Article, we have confined our examination to
two jurisdictions, the United Kingdom (excluding Scotland and Northern
Ireland) and the United States. The reasons for the selection are threefold.
First, London and New York play an important role in cross-border legal
practice. As James Faulconbridge and his co-authors have observed: “In
global lawyering London and New York stand out as the prime centers of
the service . . . the dominance of U.S. and U.K. (English in particular)
firms . . . [is] significant: they signal a new era where Anglo-American
transnational lawyering is central to the global economy.” 12 The two
jurisdictions should, therefore, provide a fruitful comparison.
Second, the United Kingdom has recently adopted a new approach to
regulating professional conduct following extensive consultation.13 Similar
debates are currently taking place in the United States. 14 Both jurisdictions
have considered the rules on conflicts of interest in depth and thus provide
useful analyses of many of the underlying concerns with allowing firms to
act in such situations.
Finally, there is limited value in making normative statements in the
absence of a full understanding of the practice environment. As Silver
suggests, 15 before embarking on a review of regulation, it is necessary to
have a reliable account of the problems that confront lawyers in their daily
work, the way in which those difficulties manifest themselves, and the way
in which they are addressed and resolved. Empirical investigations are,
therefore, an important tool to gain such understanding. Without some
attempt to examine the way in which rules are applied in practice, a
discussion of regulation will be limited by inadequate contextualization.
There have been several valuable studies conducted on conflicts of interest
in both the United States and the United Kingdom; 16 we thus have a good
understanding of the practice environment operating in these two
jurisdictions.
LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2002) (United States). For reviews
of the latter two books, see Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Law Firm Conflicts in the 21st
Century: Implications of the Globalization of Legal Services and the Growth of the ‘Mega
Firm,’ 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2005).
11. See generally GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 10.
12. See Faulconbridge et al., supra note 5, at 458–60; see also D. Daniel Sokol,
Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a Research Agenda for Further
Study, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (2007).
13. See Outcomes-Focused Regulation–Transforming the SRA’s Regulation of Legal
Services, SOLIC. REG. AUTH., http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/OFR-consultation.page
(last updated July 28, 2010).
14. See Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2012).
15. See Silver, supra note 3, at 1014–15.
16. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 10; see also GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 10.
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Before we turn to examine these jurisdictions in greater depth, in Part I
we explore the current rules on conflicts of interest for lawyers conducting
cross-border activities, and the problems with these rules.
I. THE CURRENT CROSS-BORDER POSITION
It has been suggested that there are essentially two ways in which
conflicts of interest can be regulated: first, lawyers can be prevented from
acting where conflicts arise, or second, conflicts can be controlled by
appropriate measures. 17 Presently, there are substantial differences between
the approaches of various countries. Some have strict rules prohibiting
lawyers from acting in all conflict situations; others allow conflicts to be
“managed” and “controlled” in certain situations. 18 Indeed, the definition
of what a conflict of interest is also varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. 19 While the International Bar Association (IBA) maintains that
a conflict exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client, a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer,” 20 many countries have a different understanding of the term. 21
So where does that leave lawyers, firms, and clients working in a global
environment? It seems that the differences in national rules on conflicts of
interest have to be taken into account in each individual case of crossborder practice. Thus, lawyers have to be aware of, and comply with, the
different rules in every country, while global law firms have to ensure that
their entire organization complies with the rules in each jurisdiction. The
IBA specifically recognizes these difficulties in its Code of Conduct for the
Global Legal Profession:
The differences in national rules on conflicts of interest will have to be
taken into account in any case of cross-border practice. Every lawyer is
called upon to observe the relevant rules of conflicts of interest when
engaging in the practice of law outside the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is admitted to practice. Every international law firm will have to
examine whether its entire organisation complies with such rules in every
jurisdiction. 22

The result is that while one jurisdiction may allow conflicts to be
managed by lawyers with the use of information barriers or “Chinese
walls,” another country may prohibit firms from acting in such situations.
Moreover, this prohibition may cross national boundaries—for example, the
regulation of conflicts of interest in England and Wales purports to extend
17. HARRY MCVEA, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES AND THE CHINESE WALL: REGULATING
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 122 (1993).
18. For a discussion of the regimes governing conflicts of interest in the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe, see GRIFFITHS-BAKER,
supra note 10, at 75–94.
19. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 6, cmt. 3.3.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 6, cmt. 3.3.

2012]

REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

2545

to other jurisdictions, with the rule stating that “the provisions [on conflicts]
apply to your overseas practice as well.” 23 The overall picture is therefore
confusing not only for individual lawyers, global firms, and clients, but also
for the regulation of international practice. Difficulties can be demonstrated
by the following hypothetical example:
A new highway is to be constructed across several countries. U.K. Firm
XYZ is retained by the bank financing the project, by the bondholders
putting up the bonds to create the security documents, and by the main
contractor. All wish to use the same law firm to complete the necessary
documentation because of its global expertise in the field.
An assessment of all the relevant considerations is not easy for firm XYZ
in this situation. Although the U.K. rules of conduct would allow the firm
to act, several countries in which the road is to be built may prohibit such
representation. 24 The position would be further complicated if the firm had
local offices in these countries or one of the parties to the transaction were
based in a country that also excluded lawyers from acting in such a
situation.
As the IBA acknowledges: “A universally accepted framework for
determining proper conduct in the event of conflicting or incompatible rules
has yet to be developed, although certain jurisdictions have adopted conflict
of law principles to determine which rules of professional conduct apply in
cross-border practice.” 25 By comparing the most notable differences in the
regulatory approach to conflicts adopted in the United Kingdom with that of
the United States, we hope to provide a possible way forward.
II. TRANSATLANTIC CONFLICT
A. The Regulatory Regime
The first, and perhaps most notable, difference between the United
Kingdom and United States regimes lies in their contrasting approaches to
regulation. All lawyers 26 in England and Wales are subject to the
Solicitors’ Regulation Authority’s (SRA) Code of Conduct. In the United
States, although the American Bar Association (ABA) has devised a set of
model rules, 27 the rules have not been adopted uniformly across the nation
and there are significant variations between states. 28
Another significant difference can be found in the format of the rules
themselves. As of October 2011, the SRA in England and Wales moved
23. Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2011: Rule 3: Conflict of Interests, SOLIC. REG. AUTH.,
http://sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/part2/rule3/content.page (last visited Apr. 21,
2012).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 6, cmt. 1.3.
26. For the purpose of this Article, “lawyer” in this context is defined as a Solicitor of
the Supreme Court of England and Wales.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2011).
28. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.16 (Supp.
2012).
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away from a rule-based approach to regulating lawyers, to one that focuses
on “high-level outcomes governing practice and the quality of outcomes for
clients.” 29 These “outcomes” have not changed the United Kingdom’s
position on conflicts of interest, but the “rules” are now written in a new
“outcome-focused” way. This means that “rules” are very brief—the bare
minimum—with much less information, guidance, and commentary than
before. The idea behind such an approach is that law firms and individual
lawyers can “innovate and find new ways by which they might
satisfactorily achieve the necessary outcomes in the SRA Code.”30
The new regime includes a change in the SRA’s approach to its
authorization and supervision of lawyers, and also to the enforcement of the
Code of Conduct. This change gives lawyers and firms much more
responsibility for their own supervision:
This will be risk based, proportionate and targeted and will involve a
more open and constructive relationship between the SRA and those we
regulate. Firms that are already well-managed and providing a good
service to their clients should have nothing to fear from this approach. . . .
Our approach to supervision will encourage you to identify, manage and
mitigate risks to your ability to meet the requirements of the [Code of
Conduct]. . . . We expect you to be straightforward in your dealings with
us. 31

All firms now need to appoint compliance officers for legal practice and
for finance and administration. These officers are responsible for ensuring
that the firm complies with all obligations and for reporting any material
failures. In particular, they are obliged to ensure that the firm has controls
and systems in place to enable compliance with the Code of Conduct.
Individual lawyers still have responsibility for their own compliance,
however.
The move to “outcome-focused” regulation represents a major shift in the
approach of law firm regulation in the United Kingdom. Some, however,
regard this move as a considerably risky one. Concerns have been
expressed that such a change in approach will require “serious cultural,
practical and philosophical adjustments,” 32 and that such rules will be too
vague to provide adequate guidance to practitioners or appropriate
protection for clients. 33 The “rules” might also be undermined by the
creation of another set of norms with a lower standard. Nicolson and
Webb, both strong advocates for an outcome-focused approach,
29. LAW SOC’Y, PRACTICE NOTES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1.2, available at
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/productsandservices/practicenotes/conflictofinterests/4978.arti
cle.
30. Outcomes-Focused Regulation at a Glance, SOLIC. REG. AUTH.,
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/OFR/ofr-quick-guide.page (last updated
Oct. 10, 2011).
31. Id.
32. Tony Guise, Outcomes-Focused Regulation Will Require Cultural Changes by
Solicitors, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/opinion/
comment/outcomes-focused-regulation-will-require-cultural-changes-solicitors.
33. See GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 10, at 184.
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acknowledge that a change in lawyer attitudes will not occur simply
through changes in the content and form of regulations.34 They suggest that
the new regime would have to be coupled with: (1) changes in legal
education; (2) greater participation by consumers on regulatory bodies; (3)
appointment of in-house compliance officers; (4) engagement of firms in
more pro-bono work; (5) recruitment of solicitors from different ethnic and
social backgrounds; and (6) a move away from the present adversarial
system. 35
While the SRA is working on addressing some of these points, there is a
feeling that the timetable for bringing in outcome-focused regulation is too
tight. 36 A major concern is that the rush to implement change does not
allow for full consideration about the potential consequences of change, and
that the SRA risks a breakdown in its relationship with the profession and
its stakeholders. 37
The ABA, on the other hand, adopts a far more prescriptive approach to
its regulation of lawyers. The ABA’s Model Rules contain much greater
detail and, unlike the SRA guidelines, contain little flexibility for individual
lawyers to “innovate” in their interpretation. Lawyers are required to
follow the rules and are subject to disciplinary sanction if they fail to
comply. 38 This approach has also been criticized, with some arguing that,
as lawyers have a trained capacity to find ways around rules, the more
detailed regulation becomes, the less lawyers will exercise their ethical
judgment appropriately. 39
Whatever the merits or otherwise of the relevant approaches, it is clear
that the regulatory regimes differ considerably between the two
jurisdictions. This in itself raises questions about whether harmonization of
conflict rules would be possible.
Even though the basic approach is different, it may be that the
fundamental principles for managing conflicts of interest are the same, and
thus, a way forward can be found. We shall examine this possibility in the
remainder of this part.

34. DONALD NICOLSON & JULIAN WEBB, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS: CRITICAL
INTERROGATIONS 286–92 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Timetable for Outcomes-Focused Regulation Is Too Tight and Too Risky, Law
Society Warns, LEGAL FUTURES BLOG (Jan. 23, 2011), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/
regulation/solicitors/timetable-for-outcomes-focused-regulation-is-too-tight-and-too-riskylaw-society-warns.
37. Rachel Rothwell, Warning over ‘Regulatory Ambush,’ LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Jan.
20, 2011), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/warning-over-039regulatory-ambush039.
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope, ¶ 19 (2011). Although not
intended for use outside the disciplinary process, the Model Rules acknowledge that “since
the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may
be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.” Id. ¶ 20.
39. See, e.g., ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 194–200
(2d ed. 1992); SUSAN SHAPIRO, CONFLICTING RESPONSIBILITIES: MANEUVERING THROUGH
THE MINEFIELD OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 46 (1995).
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B. Defining Conflicts
As previously indicated, the term “conflict of interest” covers many
different circumstances. Thus, defining what amounts to a conflict is not
straightforward. The SRA divides conflicts into two categories: (1)
lawyers acting where their own interests are involved (personal or own
interest conflicts); and (2) lawyers acting where a conflict arises between
two or more current clients (client conflicts).40
The ABA, on the other hand, classifies conflicts as follows: (1) lawyers
acting where a conflict arises between two or more existing clients
(concurrent conflicts); (2) lawyers acting where their own interests are
involved (personal interest conflicts); (3) lawyers acting against former
clients (former client conflicts); and (4) lawyers practicing in a firm acting
when another member of the firm would be prevented in (1) to (3) above
(imputation conflicts). 41
Others have analyzed the topic by reference to the subject matter of the
conflict, for example: (1) same-matter conflicts; (2) former-client conflicts;
(3) separate-matter conflicts; and (4) fair-dealing conflicts.42
Alternatively, conflicts can be classified on a temporal basis, that is to
say, according to when the duties of the lawyer arise. One duty may
precede the other—for example, where a lawyer represents one client and
then takes on another with conflicting interests, in which case the conflict is
“successive.” On the other hand, the duties may arise concurrently—for
example, acting for more than one party in the same transaction, in which
case the conflict is “simultaneous.” 43
Some lawyers, especially those in the United Kingdom, have classified
conflicts by reference to the subject matter.44 While this method is
commendable, we will adopt a slightly different approach and divide
conflicts as follows: (1) current-client conflicts; (2) former-client conflicts;
and (3) imputation conflicts.
We believe this distinction offers the best route into the subject,
providing as it does a convenient framework for reviewing the U.K. and
U.S. responses to conflict situations.
C. Current-Client Conflicts
The U.K. rule is brief and simply states: “You can never act where there
is a conflict, or a significant risk of conflict, between you and your
client.” 45 There are two exceptions, however: (1) where there is a client
40. See SOLIC. REG. AUTH., supra note 23.
41. Conflicts between current clients and between lawyer and client are generally
covered under Rule 1.7; former-client conflicts are addressed in Rule 1.9; and imputation
conflicts under both these rules are addressed in Rule 1.10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, R. 1.9 & R. 1.10.
42. Paul Finn, Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World, in COMMERCIAL
ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 7, 23–39 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992).
43. See JOHN GLOVER, COMMERCIAL EQUITY-FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 201–02 (1995).
44. See GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 10, at 110.
45. SOLIC. REG. AUTH., supra note 23.

2012]

REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

2549

conflict and the clients have a substantially common interest in relation to a
matter or a particular aspect of it; and (2) where there is a client conflict and
clients are competing for the same objective (or asset). 46
Where a lawyer is proposing to act under these exceptions, the following
must also apply: the lawyer must explain the relevant issues to the clients;
he must have a reasonable belief that the clients understand those issues and
risks; all clients must give informed consent in writing to the lawyer acting;
the lawyer must be satisfied that it is reasonable to act for all the clients and
in their best interests so to do; and the lawyer must be satisfied that the
benefits to the clients of acting outweigh the risks.47
It is expected that the clients will be “sophisticated users of legal
services” if they are competing for the same objective.48 In such
circumstances, no individual lawyer should act, or be responsible for the
supervision of work done, for more than one client. 49 The rule makes it
abundantly clear that lawyers in England and Wales must never act if there
is an “own interest” conflict.
The ABA model rule, at first glance, seems stricter in stating that “a
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest.” 50 The rule goes on to define a concurrent
conflict as existing if: “(1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person
or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” 51
The rule then sets out an exception, namely that even where there is a
concurrent conflict,
a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that
the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the
representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
other proceedings before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 52

Interestingly, therefore, in spite of what at first appears to be a much
stricter approach in the United States than in the United Kingdom—
including the initial prohibition of representation “directly adverse” to a
current client, even in unrelated matters—the situation is reversed in one
key area. Namely, the ABA has a more liberal approach to allowing clients
46. Id.
47. Id. at O(3.6).
48. Id. at IB(3.6).
49. Id. at O(3.7).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2011). In addition to the general rule
governing concurrent conflicts, Rule 1.8 addresses a number of commonly recurring current
conflict situations, such as business transactions between lawyers and clients, and provides
more specific guidance as to how these conflicts should be resolved. Id. at R. 1.8.
51. Id. at R. 1.7(a).
52. Id. at R. 1.7(b).
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to consent to the lawyer acting in a “current conflict” situation. In the
United Kingdom, clients must have a substantially common interest or be
competing for the same objective (and usually be a sophisticated user of
legal services) before they can consent to the same lawyer acting for them.
In the United States, however, the position is not so limited, and provided
that the lawyer reasonably believes he will be able to provide competent
and diligent representation and is not prohibited by law from acting, clients
can consent to a much wider range of conflict situations (including where
the lawyer himself has a personal conflict).
D. Former-Client Conflicts
Lawyers in the United Kingdom are under a duty to keep the affairs of
their clients confidential, but may still act against former clients provided
that they are able to obtain informed consent or, if that is not feasible, that
effective safeguards (including information barriers) are put in place.53 In
theory, the rule, and its exception, apply equally to both individual lawyers
and firms:
[Y]ou do not act for A in a matter where A has an interest adverse to B,
and B is a client for whom you hold confidential information which is
material to A in that matter, unless the confidential information can be
protected by the use of safeguards, and:
(a) you reasonably believe that A is aware of, and understands, the
relevant issues and gives informed consent;
(b) either:
(i) B gives informed consent and you agree with B the safeguards
to protect B’s information; or
(ii) where this is not possible, you put in place effective
safeguards including information barriers which comply with the
common law; and
(c) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to act for A with such
safeguards in place. 54

It is difficult to imagine, however, a way in which an individual lawyer
could ensure “effective safeguards” were in place to allow him to act against
a former client. In fact, the notes accompanying this rule indicate that
confidential information should be considered at particular risk when two or
more firms merge, or when a lawyer leaves one firm and joins another that
is acting against one of his former clients.55 The notes also state:
The following circumstances may make it difficult to implement effective
safeguards and information barriers:
(a) you are a small firm;

53. Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2011, Rule 4: Confidentiality and Disclosure, SOLIC.
REG. AUTH., http://sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/part2/rule4/content.page (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012).
54. Id. at O(4.4).
55. Id. at Notes (i)(a)–(b).
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(b) the physical structure or layout of the firm means that it will be
difficult to preserve confidentiality; or
(c) the clients are not sophisticated users of legal services. 56

The size of the firm and the nature of its client base will thus be decisive
in determining whether instructions should be accepted against former
clients. If the firm is able to erect effective safeguards, and its clients are
“sophisticated users” of legal services, it is possible for lawyers to act
against former clients without obtaining consent.
In the United States, Model Rule 1.9 states that a “lawyer who has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client
unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” 57
Similarly, a
lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer
formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person;
(2) and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
[the rules] that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 58

Obtaining informed consent is essential, therefore, if an individual lawyer
wishes to act against a former client in a substantially related matter.
E. Imputation Conflicts
It is when we look at the rules on imputation of current- and formerclient conflicts that much greater differences appear. In the United States,
virtually all conflicts under Model Rule 1.7 (namely, current-client
conflicts) are imputed to other lawyers in the firm regardless of whether the
conflict involves confidential information or merely loyalty. Model Rule
1.10 states: “While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would
be prohibited from doing so by the [model rules on conflicts].” 59 Although
there are some exceptions for former clients, as we shall see below, there
are no exceptions for current clients unless the prohibition is based on a
“personal interest” conflict. 60 This is clearly a major problem for global
practice in that what is known by one lawyer in the firm is deemed to be
known by the whole firm, irrespective of whether what the lawyer knows is
truly confidential or whether it would merely assist another client
56. Id. at Notes (ii)(a)–(b).
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a).
58. Id. at R. 1.19(b).
59. Id. at R. 1.10(a).
60. Id. at R. 1.10(a)(1) (representation prohibited “unless . . . the prohibition is based
upon a personal interest of the disqualified lawyer and does not present a significant risk of
materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm”).
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somewhere in the firm. No account is taken of the likelihood of such
information being passed. For example, in a law firm with offices
worldwide and over 2,000 lawyers, how likely is it that an associate in the
New York office will have any contact with a lawyer in a different practice
area on the other side of the world? In addition, even when confidential
information is not at stake, as when one lawyer represents a client on a
matter that is directly adverse to another client represented by a different
lawyer in the firm on an unrelated matter, the entire firm will be
disqualified from the representation unless both clients consent.
The Model Rules are more flexible with respect to the imputation of
former-client conflicts, which can be avoided if the disqualified lawyer is
timely screened and certain other precautions are taken. 61 Even here,
however, Model Rule 1.10 permits the use of non-consensual screening
only with respect to those former-client conflicts that arise because of the
disqualified lawyer’s association with a prior firm. 62 Moreover, not all
states have adopted this controversial screening provision. 63
The United Kingdom’s approach to imputation conflicts is far more
flexible, regardless of whether the conflict involves current or former
conflicts. The fee-earner must personally hold confidential information, so
there is no imputation within the firm, and the lawyer is required to disclose
only information that is “material,” so he may himself proceed with the
representation if the information is not expected to be material.64
Moreover, even if a fee-earner is in possession of “material” information,
he or his firm may continue to act provided that the information could be
protected by the use of appropriate safeguards. This may even extend to
acting without an affected client’s consent if it would not be possible to
obtain such agreement. 65
It appears, therefore, that U.S. lawyers have only one competitive
advantage over their U.K. counterparts in relation to conflicts of interest.
The ABA permits clients to give informed consent to “current client”
conflicts in every area except when there are interests at stake other than
those of the clients themselves, such as the requirement of courts to have
opposing litigants separately represented. 66 At present, U.K. clients can
give informed consent only in limited situations.
In all other respects, U.K. law firms could be said to have several
competitive advantages over U.S. law firms. The United Kingdom does not
61. Id. at R. 1.10(a)(2) (requiring, in addition to timely screening, that the lawyer be
apportioned no part of the fee from the current client, that written notice is promptly given to
the former client, and that certification of compliance with these requirements is provided
upon the former client’s written request).
62. Id.
63. See State Adoption of Lateral Screening Rule, ABA (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/late
ral_screening.authcheckdam.pdf.
64. See SOLIC. REG. AUTH., supra note 53.
65. Again, in such cases, the clients would be expected to be sophisticated users of legal
services.
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3).
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define conflict of interest to include “directly adverse” conflicts when the
client as to whom the representation is adverse is not being represented by
the lawyer or the law firm in that particular matter. 67 In addition, conflicts
are not imputed from one lawyer to another (even with respect to currentclient conflicts), and firms may in certain circumstances act against former
clients without gaining informed consent.
Such differences may prove decisive in a global environment. Evidence
already exists to show that conflicts are often used tactically by clients to
disqualify particular U.S. law firms from acting. 68 “Taint-shopping,” as it
became known, was a growing problem in the United Kingdom before the
latest rules on conflicts of interest were introduced.69 On the other hand,
given the cross-jurisdictional nature of global legal practice and the
complex rules applying in different countries, it can reasonably be argued
that enforcing conflict rules may not be an easy task for regulators or
clients.
III. POLICING GLOBAL CONFLICTS
Conflict of interest rules pose real-life problems for global law firms and
their lawyers only if there is a realistic threat that the rules will be enforced
in one or more of the relevant jurisdictions. Enforcement can be direct, as
in disciplinary actions. But it can also be indirect, as in lawsuits seeking to
stop a law firm from representing or continuing to represent a client,
motions to disqualify a lawyer from representing a client in a pending
litigation, or lawsuits to recover monetary damages for a lawyer’s breach of
fiduciary duty or legal malpractice.70
We are unaware of any disciplinary actions against global lawyers based
on alleged violations of a jurisdiction’s conflict of interest rule, and we
believe that any such actions will be extremely rare. This is because large,
corporate clients rarely file complaints with disciplinary authorities, relying
instead on either their market power or their ability to pursue other, indirect
avenues of relief. 71
As for the potential enforcement of conflicts rules through indirect
means, large corporate clients occasionally seek injunctions in the United
Kingdom, although not nearly as frequently as U.S. companies seek
67. See SOLIC. REG. AUTH., supra note 23.
68. See Marcia Chambers, Conflicts as Weapons, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at 14 (“A
trend that seems to be emerging . . . is the apparent purposeful manipulation of the conflicts
issue in order to keep a law firm from representing a specific client. A large corporation
may spread insignificant business to law firms all over the town, knowing that at some point
a case will come up that will conflict them all out.”); see also Kenric Kattner & Keith D.
Spickelmier, Client, Attorney Mobility Creates Growing Conflict of Interest Concerns, 53
TEX. B.J. 406 (1990); Victoria Slind-Flor, Client–Conflicts Patrols March On, NAT’L L.J.,
Mar. 20, 1992, at 1.
69. GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 10, at 99.
70. E.g., Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 54, 54 (1997).
71. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 10, at 532, 541; Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline
for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1991).
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disqualification in U.S. lawsuits. 72 We are unaware of any enforcement
action to date in either the United Kingdom or the United States that
addresses the differences between U.K. and U.S. conflicts rules, 73 but we
believe it is only a matter of time before such an action is brought (probably
in the United States, where disqualification motions are quite common).
We also anticipate that at some point a large, corporate client will sue a
global law firm for damages based on either breach of fiduciary duty or
legal malpractice (also most likely in the United States), arising from
allegations of impermissible conflicts,74 and the judge will need to
determine which jurisdiction’s conflict of interest rules apply. 75
72. See Moore, supra note 10, at 532. In the United Kingdom, courts deciding
injunction lawsuits typically rely on the common law, rather than on disciplinary rules. Id. at
530. In the United States, courts rely more on disciplinary rules, although they are not
strictly bound to follow such rules and often depart from them in certain situations, such as
when the complaining client has delayed unduly in bringing the matter to the court’s
attention. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial
Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996). Notably, some courts have permitted the use of
screening devices to avoid disqualification, even when the jurisdiction’s disciplinary rules do
not provide for such screening. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL, supra note 28, § 14.9, at 14–34
(2010 Supp.).
73. There are a few U.S. disqualification cases addressing potential differences between
conflict of interest rules in the United States and in foreign jurisdictions, and indicating that a
U.S. court is likely to apply U.S. rules without regard to the potentially significant
differences that may exist in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 820 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (disqualifying international
law firm from representing client in California based on the conduct of lawyers in the Hong
Kong office: applying California rules and finding that lawyers engaged in international
practice are held to the same standards as lawyers engaged in domestic practice); In re
Mortg. & Realty Trust, 195 B.R. 740, 747 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (disqualifying all lawyers
in U.S. and non-U.S. offices of an international law firm, applying the ethics rules of
California, despite recognition of realities of law firms with national and international
practices, “including foreign countries, whose standards for professional conduct may vary
substantially” from those in U.S. jurisdictions). These two decisions are discussed in Robert
M. Jarvis, Cross-Border Legal Practice and Ethics Rule 4-8.5: Why Greater Guidance Is
Needed, 72 FLA. B.J. 59 (1998). One of the authors of this Article, Professor Nancy J.
Moore, also heard Steve Krane, the recently deceased former General Counsel of the
Proskauer Rose law firm, discuss a case in which Proskauer was disqualified from
representing a client in a U.S. lawsuit due to a conflict arising in Proskauer’s Paris office.
According to Professor Moore, Mr. Krane said that the conflict went undetected when the
French lawyers in the Paris office failed to recognize a “directly adverse” conflict under Rule
1.7 because such conflicts do not exist under French law. We have been unable to find any
published reference to this case.
74. See generally 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE ch.
15 (2011 ed.) (discussing the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations as the basis for an action in
damages; also referencing other remedies for violation of fiduciary obligations, including
conflicts of interest).
75. For purposes of disqualification, courts may apply the law of the forum, regardless
of where the alleged violation occurred. See, e.g., In re Mortg. & Realty Trust, 195 B.R. at
747; Image Technical Servs., Inc., 820 F. Supp. at 1215. In other contexts, however, courts
are more likely to engage in a more complex choice-of-law analysis. See, e.g., Daynard v.
Ness, 178 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Mass. 2001) (involving law professor licensed in New York and
teaching in Massachusetts who brought an action in Massachusetts seeking to enforce an oral
fee-splitting agreement entered into in Illinois, by lawyers from Mississippi and South
Carolina, with respect to multiple lawsuits filed in different jurisdictions on behalf of certain
state governments against tobacco companies); Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in
Multijurisdictional Practice—Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at
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In addition to the substantive differences between conflict of interest
rules in the United Kingdom and the United States, these jurisdictions may
differ in their choice-of-law rules. In civil lawsuits referencing but not
directly enforcing disciplinary rules, a court might well apply choice-of-law
principles that govern other, similar civil litigation, such as the choice-oflaw rules that apply to disputes concerning contracts or torts.76 This
approach has been taken in some U.S. cases, 77 although there are also
indications that courts in such actions may rely on professional conduct
rules, not only for substantive guidance in determining whether a law firm
should be disqualified or whether its lawyers have breached their fiduciary
duties to a client or committed legal malpractice, but also for whatever
guidance such rules provide on the appropriate choice-of-law rule. 78
If and when disciplinary authorities or courts look to professional
conduct rules for guidance in determining which choice-of-law principles to
apply, either in disciplinary or in non-disciplinary proceedings, they will
find that the professional conduct choice-of-law rules differ significantly in
the United Kingdom and the United States. In the United Kingdom,
solicitors are directed to comply with the SRA’s conflict of interest rules in
their overseas practices as well as in their domestic ones.79 Given that the
SRA drafters were well aware that solicitors practicing outside the United
Kingdom may also be subject to a host jurisdiction’s conflict of interest
rules, 80 the failure to provide an exception for compliance with the host
All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 771–73 (1995) (discussing choice-of-law analysis in several
decisions concerning conflicting contingent fee rules); Nancy J. Moore, Choice of Law for
Professional Responsibility Issues in Aggregate Litigation, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
73, 85, 91–93 (2009) (discussing complex choice-of-law analysis in actions such as
Daynard).
76. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. e (“In
general, traditional choice-of-law principles, such as those set out in the Restatement Second
of Conflict of Laws, have governed questions of choice of law in nondisciplinary litigation
involving lawyers.”); Vagts, supra note 5, at 689–96 (discussing application of general
choice-of-law principles to legal malpractice actions, based on rules applicable to torts and
contracts).
77. See, e.g., Bernick v. Frost, 510 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). At the
time that Bernick was decided, the ABA Model Rules did not contain a specific choice-oflaw rule, even for disciplinary proceedings, but rather merely provided in comments that
“principles of conflict of laws” and “applicable rules of choice of law” may apply when
lawyers are licensed in two or more jurisdictions that impose conflicting obligations. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmts. 2–3 (1983); see also Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d
830 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing to enforce a German lawyer’s fee computed on statutory basis,
when no work had been done, because it was in violation of U.S. public policy); Daly, supra
note 75, at 750–51.
78. See, e.g., Daynard, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 18–19 (looking to choice-of-law disciplinary
rules in five relevant jurisdictions to determine the ethical propriety of a fee-splitting
agreement); see also Moore, supra note 75, at 91–93 (discussing choice-of-law discussion in
Daynard and arguing that court mistakenly concluded that the choice-of-law rules in the five
relevant jurisdictions were the same).
79. See SOLIC. REG. AUTH., supra note 53.
80. Each chapter within the 2011 SRA Code of Conduct has its own outcomes for
outside counsel, in-house practice, and overseas practice. In contrast to the chapter on
conflicts of interest, some chapters provide that a solicitor in an overseas practice need not
comply with the outcomes governing outside counsel within the United Kingdom,

2556

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

jurisdiction’s rules for conflicts of interest suggests that the SRA drafters
were consciously adopting what has been described as the “double
deontology” approach. 81 This approach, which may be prevalent in
Europe—that is, outside of cross-border activities within Europe—directs
lawyers to comply with the rules of both the home and the host country. 82
This may be possible when the rules do not directly conflict, 83 although the
particularly when compliance would violate local rules or customs. See, e.g., id. ch. 1 (Client
Care) at OP (1.1) (“[Y]ou [must] properly account to your clients for any financial benefit
you receive as a result of your instructions unless it is the prevailing custom of your local
jurisdiction to deal with financial benefits in a different way.”); see also SOLICITORS’ CODE
OF CONDUCT 2007 R. 15.01(2)(c) (providing with regard to “core duties” under Rule 1 that
“if compliance with any provision of these rules would result in your breaching local law,
you may disregard that provision to the extent necessary to comply with that local law”).
81. See, e.g., MAYA GOLDSTEIN BOLOCAN, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS:
A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 93 (2002) (“The term double deontology often is used,
particularly in Europe, to express the idea that a lawyer engaged in transnational legal
practice may be subject to the ethics rules and discipline in both the home jurisdiction and
the host jurisdiction. If a lawyer is subject to two different sets of ethics rules and discipline,
the possibility exists that the rules may not be identical.”).
82. See, e.g., Directive 98/5/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
February 1998 to Facilitate Practice of the Profession of Lawyer on a Permanent Basis in a
Member State Other than that in Which the Qualification Was Obtained, 1998 O.J. (L 77)
36, art. (6): With respect to the practice “of [a] lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member
State other than that in which the qualification was obtained,” the Directive provides:
Irrespective of the rules of professional conduct to which he is subject in his home
Member State, a lawyer practising under his home country professional title shall
be subject to the same rules of professional conduct as lawyers practising under the
relevant professional title of the host Member State in respect of all the activities
he pursues in its territory.
The Directive further provides that the home state should have an opportunity to
offer comments before the host state disciplines a lawyer. Id.; see also INT’L BAR ASS’N,
supra note 6, cmt. 1.3 (“Every lawyer is called upon to observe applicable rules of
professional conduct in both home and host jurisdictions (‘Double Deontology’) when
engaging in the practice of law outside the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to
practice.”); INT’L BAR ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF ETHICS R. 1 (1988), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=A9AB05AA-8B69-4BF2B52C-97E1CF774A1B (“A lawyer undertaking professional work in a jurisdiction where he
is not a full member shall adhere to the standards of professional ethics in the jurisdiction in
which he has been admitted. He shall also observe all ethical standards which apply to
lawyers where he is working.”). The Code of Conduct for European Lawyers represents an
attempt “to mitigate the difficulties which result from the application of ‘double
deontology’” by providing that, with respect to cross-border activities within the European
Union and the European Economic Area, the European lawyer will be bound by the
provisions of this Code. COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOC’YS OF EUR., CHARTER OF CORE
PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN
LAWYERS 1.3.1–1.5 (2010), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/
NTCdocument/EN_Code_of_conductp1_1306748215.pdf [hereinafter CCBE Code of
Conduct]. Individual provisions of the Code, however, often direct the lawyer to apply with
the provisions of both the host state and the home state when those provisions are not in
direct conflict, thus requiring the lawyer to comply with the stricter of the two rules. E.g., id.
at 2.8 (to the extent permitted by both the host and home state, the lawyer may limit
liabilities toward a client). The CCBE Code of Conduct has been widely adopted within
Europe. See Adoption of the CCBE Code of Conduct 2006, CCBE (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/CoC_adoption_for_web1_12980
21202.pdf.
83. See, e.g., CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.3.2 (“After the rules in this
Code have been adopted as enforceable rules in relation to a lawyer’s cross-border activities,
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results in such a case might not be satisfactory, for reasons we discuss
shortly. 84 Of course, it will not be possible to comply with both sets of
rules when they are in direct conflict, as when one jurisdiction requires
conduct that the other jurisdiction forbids,85 in which case “double
deontology” rules may not provide further guidance. The lack of such
guidance for the SRA’s conflict of interest rules suggests that the SRA
believes that lawyers can typically comply with two sets of conflicts rules
by adopting the most conservative approaches under both sets. It is at least
theoretically possible that there may be some instances of direct conflict of
such rules, but these instances are likely to be rare.
State courts in the United States do not take such a “double deontology”
approach. Rather, their choice-of-law rules direct lawyers to comply with
the rules of a single state. But individual states have adopted choice-of-law
rules that differ significantly in the means of identifying which
jurisdiction’s ethics rules should apply. Some states continue to follow the
original Model Rules approach in Rule 8.5, in which a disciplinary
authority was directed to follow the rules of the admitting jurisdiction
unless the lawyer was either licensed in two jurisdictions, or practiced law
outside an admitting jurisdiction, in which case general choice-of-law
principles would apply. 86 Other states follow the approach adopted by the
ABA in its 1993 amendments to Rule 8.5: for conduct outside of litigation,
the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed apply, unless the
lawyer is licensed in more than one jurisdiction, in which case the rules that
apply are the “the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer
principally practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly
has its predominant affect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction” are to be applied.87 Still
other jurisdictions have adopted the ABA’s 2002 amendments to Rule 8.5.
Under this rule, for matters not in connection with a matter pending before
a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct
occurred apply, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different
jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.88
the lawyer will remain bound to observe the rules of the Bar or Law Society to which he or
she belongs to the extent that they are consistent with the rules in this Code.”).
84. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., BOLOCAN, supra note 81, at 35 (discussing the conflict between U.S. rules
requiring the lawyer’s duty to disclose information to clients and lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality in most European countries, which requires lawyers to keep confidential
communications between lawyers, prohibiting disclosure even to the client); see also
Catherine Rogers, Cross-Border Bankruptcy as a Model for the Regulation of International
Attorneys, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF DETLEV VAGTS 635 (2010) (providing additional examples of when a lawyer may
be “mandated to perform certain conduct expressly prohibited by the rules of another
jurisdiction”).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmts. 2–3 (1983). Alabama, Hawaii, and
Kansas continue to take this approach.
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(2) (1993). The District of Columbia and
New York take this approach.
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). As of October 21, 2009,
thirty-one states had adopted the current version of Rule 8.5(b)(2) without significant
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Neither the 1993 rule nor the 2002 rule provide any guidance for
determining where the “predominant effect” of a lawyer’s conduct will
occur; however, the 2002 rule provides that “[a] lawyer shall not be subject
to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction
in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the
lawyer’s conduct will occur.” 89 Unfortunately, this “safe harbor” approach
provides no protection for the lawyer in non-disciplinary actions, in which
the court must apply the law of one jurisdiction or another. 90
Given that the United Kingdom generally takes a “double deontology”
approach with respect to conflicts of interest,91 global lawyers engaged in a
representation with significant U.S. and U.K. contacts must comply with
both sets of conflict of interest rules in order to avoid a possible
enforcement action in either jurisdiction. This would require global lawyers
and their law firms to decline significantly more engagements than they
would need to decline in either jurisdiction alone. For example, they would
need to define conflicts as broadly as U.S. jurisdictions typically do,
including representations directly adverse to a current client in unrelated
matters. 92 At the same time, they would be precluded from proceeding with
informed consent in a number of situations permitted by the U.S. (but not
the U.K.) rules, including matters in which multiple clients do not have “a
substantially common interest” or are not “competing for the same
objective,” as well as personal interest conflicts. 93
Even in the absence of an actual conflict between the two sets of rules,
relying on “double deontology” fails to provide a satisfactory solution for
global firms and global lawyers. As a practical matter, it may be unfairly
burdensome to require global law firms to comply with the requirements of
two separate regimes when the results exceed the prohibitions of either
regime alone. Practicalities aside, it is also conceptually objectionable to
always favor the stricter of two rules; such an approach completely ignores,
and thus devalues, the legitimate interests of the regime that takes the more
permissive approach. 94 This effect is even more problematic when one
considers that what lawyers would have to do to avoid liability goes beyond
modification. See Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.5
Comment [7], ABA (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
cpr/pic/8_5_cmt_7.authcheckdam.pdf.
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
90. See Moore, supra note 75, at 83–84.
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 37–63 and accompanying text.
93. See id.
94. For example, when the District of Columbia adopted a rule permitting non-lawyer
partners, most national firms declined to make non-lawyer partners in their D.C. offices
because of uncertainty as to how this would affect their practices outside of the District. The
result was to give short shrift to the District of Columbia’s interest in permitting its lawyers
to practice in a manner that the District of Columbia believed would offer significant
benefits to D.C. clients, as well as to the lawyers and law firms. See Daly, supra note 75, at
767 n.208. In other words, lawyers admitted both in the District of Columbia and in other
bars could avoid conflict by not taking advantage of the D.C. rule but “their acquiescence
would, as a practical matter, infringe on the autonomy of the District of Columbia bar to
fashion its rules as it chooses. It would be a captive of the other jurisdictions.” Id.
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the prohibitions enacted by either regime alone—a result that is not only
intolerable for global law firms, but also difficult to justify as a client
protection measure.
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
The two competing approaches to addressing the uncertainties faced by
global lawyers who are potentially subject to different regulatory regimes
have been described as “harmonisation” and “territorialism.” 95 Under
harmonization, the differences between regulatory regimes disappear (or are
minimized), either because a single super-regulator displaces the competing
regimes or because the regimes themselves voluntarily eliminate significant
differences between their rules.96 “Territorialism,” on the other hand,
acknowledges the reality—perhaps even the desirability—of conflicting
substantive rules, and focuses instead on developing clear (or clearer)
choice-of-law rules. 97
As for a potential super-regulator, someday a supra-national body may
emerge that will establish a single set of “world-wide prescriptions” for
lawyers engaged in multinational transactions; however, such a prospect is
nowhere in sight today. 98 At least one international tribunal has established
professional rules for all lawyers appearing before it, whatever their
nationality. 99 Not all tribunals have done so, however, 100 and outside of
tribunals, no supra-national authorities presently exist that have the
authority or the will to promulgate a single set of rules designed to govern
multinational lawyers.
In the short-term, therefore, it is more realistic to focus on voluntary
cooperation among different regulatory regimes. Because Anglo-American
law firms have dominated the commercial market for global lawyering, 101 it
makes sense to look first to the United Kingdom and the United States and
ask whether their conflict of interest rules might be harmonized to a greater
extent than they are today. We propose two areas for potential reform—one
on the part of the U.K. regulators and one on the part of the U.S. regulators.
95. See Rogers, supra note 85, at 638–40.
96. The adoption of the CCBE Code of Conduct reflects a blend of these two approaches
to harmonization. The CCBE proposed a single code, which was then voluntarily adopted
by the individual European states, but only for purposes of cross-border activities within
Europe. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
97. See Rogers, supra note 85, at 639 (territorialism proponents promote “greater
reciprocal respect for conflicting national rules and clearer choice-of-law rules”).
98. See Vagts, supra note 5, at 677–78; see also Rogers, supra note 85, at 638–39
(proponents of territorialism “contend that . . . universalism is impossible”).
99. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 1077–79 (describing adoption of ICTY Code of
Professional Conduct).
100. Id. at 1057.
101. See, e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the
Global Practice of Law?, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931, 934 (2001). Anglo-American
law firms have a competitive advantage as a result of their experience in mergers,
acquisitions and complex transnational transactions, as well as the dominance of AngloAmerican capital markets and financial institutions, and the dominance of U.S. and English
law in regulating international financial transactions. Id.
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Before turning to these two reforms, however, we first note that, as a
practical matter, it may be exceedingly difficult to harmonize U.S. rules
with those of other countries so long as U.S. lawyers are governed by
different state conflict of interest rules. 102 Fortunately, the conflict of
interest rules among the fifty states differ less than some other rules, such as
rules governing confidentiality.
Nevertheless, there are important
differences, such as a law firm’s ability to employ screening devices in
order to avoid having the conflict of one lawyer imputed to the entire
firm. 103 Although we do not propose that U.S. lawyers should be federally
regulated, 104 we do suggest that it may be time for Congress to impose
national standards in selective areas, such as conflict of interest rules for
lawyers engaged in multistate or multinational practice. Any such national
legislation should follow the ABA Model Rules, with the proposed change
we discuss below.
For the United Kingdom, the most important effort at harmonization
would be to relax the rule prohibiting lawyers from proceeding with
conflicted representation, even with their clients’ informed consent, which
is currently permitted only in limited situations.105 U.K. regulators should
instead adopt the U.S. approach, which permits clients to give informed
consent to conflicts whenever it is reasonable to expect that the lawyer can
provide reasonably competent and diligent representation. 106
For the United States, the most important effort at harmonization would
be to relax the rule requiring the imputation of the conflicts of one lawyer to
102. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Global Continental Shifts to New Governance Paradigm
in Lawyer Regulation and Consumer Protection: Riding the Wave, reprinted in
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE
PROFESSION 11 (Francesca Bartlett et al. eds., 2011) (comparing “progressive reforms in the
United Kingdom with the balkanized state-based lawyer regulation in the United States”).
According to Maute, the “balkanized” regime in the United States disadvantages U.S.
lawyers in the international marketplace and “risks criticism as arcane, self-interested and
disserving the public interest.” Id. at 38.
103. For a chart comparing state rules on the screening of lateral lawyers to avoid
imputation of conflicts, see State Adoption of Lateral Screening Rule, ABA (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/late
ral_screening.authcheckdam.pdf.
104. For a proposal to nationalize U.S. legal ethics rules through federalization, see Fred
C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 345 (1994). For a more recent
discussion of the disadvantages of this proposal, see Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics,
Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American Legal Profession in a Global
Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2011) (rejecting the proposal to federalize U.S.
legal ethics rule and proposing instead an “open-border national jurisdiction for purposes of
lawyer’s authorized law practice”).
105. See supra notes 40–68 and accompanying text.
106. Of course, conflicts of interest cannot be waived when there are other interests at
stake, such as if a tribunal has an interest in having opposing litigants represented by
different law firms. See supra notes 40–68 and accompanying text. This is similar to the
approach taken in the United Kingdom and in other Commonwealth countries, including
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. See GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 10, at 45–46, 81–
108. The United Kingdom’s current position is closer to the position of most European
countries, as exemplified in the CCBE Code of Conduct, which does not contain any
provision for client consent to a conflict. See BOLOCAN, supra note 81, at 42–44 (describing
both the CCBE Code of Conduct and individual approaches of several European countries).
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all lawyers in the law firm, which cannot currently be avoided except in
very limited situations. 107 It is not necessary that the United States go as
far as the United Kingdom, which does not generally impute either current
or former client conflicts; 108 rather, it would be sufficient to permit law
firms to avoid imputation—for both current and former client conflicts—
when the different representations involve lawyers in physically separate
offices in separate states or separate countries, so long as the law firms have
implemented effective screening devices.109 This change would not
eliminate imputation when lawyers in different offices are personally
involved in the conflicted representations, but it would go a long way to
reduce the current uncertainty in multinational representations.
We will not attempt to argue in any detail as to why these two rule
changes are reasonable. It will be sufficient for our purposes: (1) to
suggest that these are the two rule changes that would do the most to
harmonize the two sets of conflict of interest rules for global lawyers; and
(2) to point out that both the United Kingdom and the United States have
legal and regulatory regimes that are advanced and similar enough that,
history and custom notwithstanding, it makes sense to say that what is done
in either country 110 should constitute a reasonable approach to lawyer
regulation. In other words, in the absence of regulatory overlap, each
regime might be reasonable in preferring its own current approach over the
approach of the other; however, given the difficulties presented by
regulatory overlap, it should be reasonable for each regime to take an
important step toward harmonization, as long as it does not adversely
impact other aspects of that regulatory regime.
Given that we are advocating loosening current restrictions, it will be
natural for both sets of regulators to object on the ground that client
protection demands a more restrictive approach, particularly when the
clients are individuals and cannot be expected to protect themselves against
the risks of conflicted representation. This is a reasonable objection, and
the solution may be to limit the relaxation of these rules to situations
involving either “sophisticated clients” or clients represented by an
independent lawyer, including in-house counsel. This is the method we
take in our proposal to reform the “territorial” approach via choice-of-law
rules, and we discuss the details and the merits of that proposal in that part
of the Article. 111 For now, we note simply that this approach fits easily
107. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 40–68 and accompanying text.
109. Under the 2011 SRA Code of Conduct, neither current nor former client conflicts are
imputed to other lawyers; therefore, no screening is formally required. See supra notes 40–
56 and accompanying text. However, law firms are required to “have effective systems and
controls in place to enable [them] to identify risks to client confidentiality and to mitigate
those risks,” which may require screens as a practical matter. SOLICITORS’ CODE OF
CONDUCT 2011 ch.4 at O(4.5).
110. We acknowledge that the screening proposal for the United States goes beyond what
is currently in place under the 2011 SRA Code of Conduct; however, it is not inconsistent
with common law decisions in the United Kingdom.
111. See infra notes 117–39 and accompanying text.
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with the proposed reform to the U.K. rules, which focuses on the ability of
clients to render informed consent to a conflict: 112 sophisticated clients and
clients represented by an independent lawyer are clearly more capable of
rendering truly informed consent. 113 This approach does not fit as readily
with the proposed reform to the U.S. rules, in which client consent to
screening devices is not required. Such a reform could, however, be limited
to conflicts involving either sophisticated clients or clients represented by
an independent lawyer 114 and, in addition, could require the law firm to
advise the clients of the existence of both the conflict and the
implementation of screening, which would then give the clients the option
of taking their business to a law firm which is not similarly conflicted.115
There are a host of reasons why neither the United Kingdom nor the
United States is likely to make these complementary efforts toward
harmonization. Among them is the practical concern that, if the motivation
for reform is to harmonize the two sets of rules, there would need to be
some assurance that both regimes will in fact implement the change
designed to accommodate the other regime.
Given the current
“balkanization” of regulatory regimes in the United States, 116 it will be
extraordinarily difficult to implement changes that apply to U.S. lawyers as
a whole. For that reason, it may be more realistic to focus on “territorial”
changes to conflict of interest rules, in which case our reform proposals
make sense on their own for either regulator and do not require reciprocal
change on the part of the other regulator.
Prompted in part by one of several “Proposals of Law Firm General
Counsel for Future Regulation of Relationships Between Law Firms and
Sophisticated Clients,” 117 the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20118 has

112. Under ABA Model Rule 1.7(b), which is the basis for the U.K. reform proposal, a
conflict is not consentable unless “the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client” and each client
renders “informed consent.” The capacity of particular clients both to understand the
significance of a conflict and to protect himself or herself in light of limitations on the scope
of the representation by a common lawyer is critical in determining both whether the conflict
is consentable and whether the client has given informed consent. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2011). In determining whether consent to a future conflict
is effective, “[t]he effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to
which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails”: consent
given by an “experienced user of legal services,” particularly if that client is “independently
represented by other counsel in giving consent” is more likely to be effective. Id.
113. See, e.g., supra note 112 (describing circumstances in which client consent to a
future conflict is likely to be upheld).
114. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM GENERAL
COUNSEL FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW FIRMS AND
SOPHISTICATED CLIENTS 31–39 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20110707_mjp_comment_compilation.authcheckdam.pdf.
115. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)(2)(ii)–(iii) & Comment [9]–
[10] (notification and certification requirements for implementation of non-consensual
screening of certain former client conflicts).
116. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 102.
117. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 114.
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published for comment an initial proposal to permit lawyers and clients to
“agree that their relationship concerning the matter will be governed by the
conflict rules of a specific United States or foreign jurisdiction, which may
be other than the jurisdiction whose rules would apply under [the current
choice-of-law rule].” 119 The Commission proposes to make this change in
a new comment to Rule 1.7, which permits such agreements only under the
following conditions:
The client gives written informed consent to the agreement, confirmed in
writing; the lawyer advises the client in writing of the desirability of
seeking independent counsel regarding the agreement; the client has a
reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel regarding the
agreement; the selected jurisdiction must be one in which the predominant
effect of, or substantial work relating to, the matter is reasonably expected
to occur; and the agreement may not result in the application of a conflict
rule to which informed client consent is not permitted under the rules of
the jurisdiction whose rules would otherwise govern the matter . . . .
Client consent under this paragraph is more likely to be effective if the
client is an experienced user of legal services. 120

We agree with the concept of permitting lawyers and clients to agree on
which set of conflict of interest rules will govern their relationship,
although we have reservations about some of the specific details of the
proposal.
Permitting lawyers and clients to agree on which of several jurisdictions’
ethics rules will apply cannot work for all or even most aspects of a
particular representation. This is because many of the ethics rules are
designed for the protection of persons other than the client. 121 The conflict
of interest rules, however, are primarily concerned with protecting client
interests; 122 therefore, if choice-of-law agreements are to be permitted at
all, these would appear to be among the most appropriate rules for
inclusion. So long as the jurisdiction chosen has a substantial relationship
to the proposed representation,123 it makes sense to allow the parties to
118. For information on this Commission, see ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_
20_20.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
119. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INITIAL DRAFT PROPOSAL—CHOICE OF LAW AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20110907_final_ethics_2020_rule_1_7_choice_
of_law_conflicts_initial_resolution_and_report_for_comment.authcheckdam.pdf.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3) (2011) (permitting
disclosures adverse to client to prevent death or serious bodily harm or to prevent, rectify, or
mitigate substantial economic harm to a person other than the client).
122. But see, e.g., id. at R. 1.7(b)(3) & cmt. 17 (prohibiting consent to a conflict when
lawyer or firm represents both sides of a contested proceeding before a tribunal because of
“the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client’s position”).
123. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971)
(providing that the chosen state must have a “substantial relationship” to the parties or the
transaction or that there is some other “reasonable basis for the parties’ choice”). In some
situations, it may be reasonable for the parties to choose a jurisdiction that does not have a
substantial relationship to the representation. See, e.g., id. at cmt. f (“[W]hen contracting in
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eliminate or reduce the uncertainty otherwise inherent in multistate or
multinational representations. 124
Substantively, we have several objections to the specific proposal from
the Ethics 20/20 Commission. 125 First, we question whether it should apply
to all representations, including individual clients who are neither
sophisticated nor experienced in using lawyers, so long as they are given
the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. 126 Although such
clients are less likely to be found to have given informed consent, they are
also less likely to resist the application of any such agreement, thereby
increasing the risk that unscrupulous lawyers will successfully overreach by
choosing the law of a jurisdiction that the lawyer knows (but the client does
not) is far friendlier to the lawyer than to the client. We would rather have
the proposal limited to so-called “sophisticated clients” 127—or as the Ethics
20/20 proposal describes them, “experienced users of legal services”—or to
clients actually represented by an independent lawyer 128 in making the
agreement.
Second, we prefer to limit the permissibility of such agreements to those
clients who choose to be represented by independent counsel, including inhouse counsel, 129 in making the agreement. Defining terms such as
“sophisticated clients” 130 or even “experienced users of legal services” will
countries whose legal systems are strange to them, as well as relatively immature, the parties
should be able to choose a law on the ground that they know it well and that it is sufficiently
developed.”).
124. Thus, courts generally enforce choice-of-law clauses in contracts. See, e.g., Michael
S. Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237,
1259 (2011).
125. A non-substantive objection we have to the proposal is that the provision permitting
certain choice-of-law agreements should be located in the black letter text and not in a
comment. That text should appear in Model Rule 8.5(b), which is the general choice-of-law
rule for disciplinary purposes. A comment to Model Rule 1.7 could alert lawyers to the
possibility of eliminating uncertainty through such a choice-of-law agreement, crossreferencing to the relevant provision in Model Rule 8.5(b).
126. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
127. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 114.
128. Cf. Richard W. Painter, Advance Wavier of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289,
312–13 (2000) (proposing a bright line rule of “separate representation” with respect to the
efficacy of advance conflicts waiver: “Courts thus should generally enforce a waiver if it is
unambiguous and the client is independently represented by another lawyer, including inhouse counsel, at the time the waiver is given”).
129. We use the term “independent lawyer” to indicate that the lawyer representing the
client in making the agreement be independent of the lawyer who will be a party to the
agreement. See id. at 327 (“[A]dvance waivers should be uniformly enforced, but only when
the client is independently represented at the time of the waiver by a lawyer, including inhouse counsel, who is unaffiliated with the lawyer receiving the consent.”). As Painter
suggests, representation by a corporate client’s in-house counsel is clearly sufficient to
satisfy this requirement. See id.
130. See, e.g., Lauren N. Morgan, Finding Their Niche: Advance Conflict Waivers
Facilitate Industry-Based Lawyering, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963, 985 (2008) (discussing
uncertainty concerning the determination of who is a “sophisticated client”). A New York
ethics committee defines a “sophisticated client” as “one that readily appreciates the
implications of conflicts and waivers. This would include, but not be limited to, clients that
regularly engage outside counsel for legal services, or that have access to independent or
inside counsel for advice on conflicts.” Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on
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be difficult; as a result, any definition will inevitably be either under- or
over-inclusive. Limiting the proposal to clients actually represented by
independent counsel avoids these difficulties; moreover, this is a technique
used elsewhere in the ABA Model Rules. 131 Most multinational companies
have in-house counsel, and if they do, it will not be burdensome to insist
that such counsel participate in making the agreement. Of course, it will
also be sufficient for such companies to retain outside counsel, so long as
the lawyer involved is independent of the lawyer on the other side of the
agreement.
Avoiding the difficulties associated with defining “sophisticated clients”
or “experienced users of legal services” is not the only reason to prefer an
actual representation requirement. As Richard Painter has argued, clients
represented by independent counsel are more likely to be adequately
informed in making a choice-of-law agreement. 132 In addition, regardless
of whether the client fully understands the implications of the agreement,
clients who choose to act through an agent such as a lawyer are legally
bound to agreements entered into by the agent, so long as the agent is acting
within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority. 133 This is
because other parties who deal with such agents are entitled to rely on their
Thus, lawyers entering into agreements with clients
authority. 134
represented by an independent lawyer should be entitled to rely on such

Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1, 2006 WL 1662501 at *1 n.1 (2006). Of course,
clients that regularly engage outside counsel do not necessarily have experience in granting
conflict waivers, particularly if they do not have in-house counsel; moreover, such a
definition is far from the bright line test that is preferable from a practical perspective. See
Painter, supra note 128, at 309. The Law Firm General Counsel’s proposal concurs that
“bright line criteria” are very important and proposes a series of “safe harbor” tests for
determining who is a sophisticated client, including: publicly traded companies, frequent
users of legal services with a reasonable opportunity to obtain the advice of independent
counsel; clients with a balance sheet with assets over $25 million; an annual budget for legal
services over $300,000; a client that operates in at least five jurisdictions; or a governmental
entity with the ability to give conflicts waivers.” See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra
note 114, at 2–3.
131. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (2011) (the lawyer may not
“make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice
unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement”). Prior to 2002,
Model Rule 1.8(h) prohibited agreements prospectively limiting the lawyer’s malpractice
liability unless such agreements were “permitted by law.” Given that there was apparently
no law that permitted such agreements, the ABA amended the rule in 2002 to permit such
representations on the ground that there may sometimes be good reasons to permit the client
to do so; it was concluded that clients were adequately protected when represented by
independent counsel. See Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, Rule 1.8h(1), ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commis
sion/e2k_rule18rem.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). We believe that the use of this
formulation, which is obviously more restrictive than provisions permitting lawyer conduct
when the client is given the mere opportunity to consult independent counsel, is justified
when the risks of the lawyer conduct are extremely high and the benefits to clients are low.
We believe this is the case when clients are unlikely to understand the implications of a
choice-of-law provision for conflicts of interest.
132. See Painter, supra note 128, at 112.
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 26–27 (2000).
134. Id. § 27 cmt. b.
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agreements, and if the independent lawyer is negligent in advising the client
to enter into the agreement, then the client’s remedy is a malpractice lawsuit
against the independent lawyer. 135 Perhaps it is harsh and, at times, unfair
to bind unsophisticated clients to the conduct of lawyer-agents; however,
unsophisticated clients are unlikely to invest the time and expense to retain
independent counsel. As a result, the practical effect of this proposal will
be to implement a “sophisticated client” requirement while at the same time
avoiding all of the difficulties entailed in the use of that or a similar term.
Finally, we object to the requirement that “the agreement may not result
in the application of a conflict rule to which informed client consent is not
permitted under the rules of the jurisdiction whose rules would otherwise
govern the matter.” 136 First, if there is such a non-consentability provision
in a jurisdiction whose rules might otherwise govern, then it will be
necessary to routinely determine which jurisdiction’s rules would govern in
the absence of the agreement. In such cases, regardless of the outcome, the
parties will have been thwarted in their efforts to achieve certainty at the
outset of the representation and to avoid the time and expense of making
such a determination. 137 Second, and perhaps more important, such a
requirement assumes that each and every application of the nonconsentability provisions constitutes a “fundamental policy” of the adopting
jurisdiction and that the adopting jurisdiction’s interests are materially
greater than the interest of the chosen state.138 Such a sweeping assumption
ignores the likelihood that jurisdictions will develop a more nuanced
approach toward which particular aspects of their non-consentability
provisions must be followed, regardless of the particular circumstances
(including a choice-of-law agreement), 139 and substantially undermines the
provision’s purpose of permitting the parties to agree ex ante as to which
jurisdiction’s conflict of interest rules will govern.

135. Id. at cmt. f.
136. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 119, at 6.
137. Also, this requirement ignores the fact that Model Rule 8.5(a) acknowledges the
difficulty of determining which jurisdiction’s rules will apply and offers the lawyer a safe
haven from discipline so long as the lawyer complies with the rules of a jurisdiction that the
lawyer reasonably believes would be chosen under the choice-of-law provisions of that rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2011).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. g (1971) (“Application
of the chosen law will be refused only (1) to protect a fundamental policy of the state which,
under [the general conflicts of laws rule] would be the state of the otherwise applicable law,
provided (2) that this state has a materially greater interest than the state of the chosen law in
the determination of a particular issue.”).
139. For example, the United Kingdom currently prohibits client consent to conflicts in
virtually all “same matter” representations. See supra Part II.C. Nevertheless, regulators
might be willing to permit parties represented by separate counsel to agree to be bound by
U.S. rules, which permit such representation with informed client consent, subject to the
requirement that the lawyer reasonably believe that the lawyer can competently and
diligently represent all the affected clients. See supra Part II.C. We should not presume that
U.K. regulators would rigidly insist on applying their own non-consentability provisions in
such situations.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the current regulatory regimes in both
the United Kingdom and the United States are inadequate to serve the needs
of international law practice, including both global clients and their
increasingly global law firms. Focusing on practical problems that arise in
the day-to-day practice of lawyers engaged in cross-border legal work,
primarily transactions, we have highlighted the ethical dilemma of lawyers
confronting potentially impermissible conflicts of interest. Comparing the
ethical rules in the relevant regulatory regimes, we conclude that despite
general agreement on the principle that lawyers should not act when the
interests of their clients may conflict, the U.K. and U.S. rules differ
significantly not only in their definitions of what constitutes a conflict of
interest, but also in their articulation of the exceptions in which law firms
are permitted to undertake a proposed representation with the informed
consent of the affected clients. Also, and just as important, the regulatory
regimes differ in their approach to the choice-of-law dilemma facing
lawyers and law firms that practice in both countries: the United Kingdom
takes a “double deontology” approach, in which lawyers are expected to
comply with the rules of both the home and host jurisdiction, whereas in the
United States, states have adopted choice-of-law rules that direct lawyers to
comply with the rules of a single jurisdiction, although it is often unclear
which jurisdiction’s rules apply.
As it is unlikely (and perhaps undesirable) that any super-regulator will,
in the near future, establish a single set of conflict of interest rules for both
U.K. and U.S. lawyers, we have put forth two sets of reform proposals.
One set of proposals describes efforts that both the United Kingdom and the
United States could take voluntarily to harmonize their conflict rules. The
other set of proposals focuses instead on the adoption of an improved
choice-of-law rule, along the lines currently proposed by the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20. While we have criticisms of that particular
proposal, we agree with the overall effort to permit sophisticated clients to
choose the particular regulatory regime to govern conflicts of interest that
arise during the course of the representation.
One of the benefits of the choice-of-law approach is that it is applicable
not only to transatlantic legal practice, but also to conflicts of interest that
arise in cross-border practice throughout the world. We have chosen to
focus on the United Kingdom and the United States because these are the
countries whose law firms are currently most heavily invested in crossborder transactions, and because these are the regulatory regimes with
which we are most familiar. But most of these law firms are genuinely
global, with offices in multiple countries, and their legal practices
encompass truly global transactions, involving multiple global actors. We
believe that the best way forward in regulating the conflicts of interest of
global law firms may be to recognize the right of lawyers and clients to
decide for themselves which of multiple potential regulatory regimes should
govern these conflicts.

